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Wire Fraud Prevention for CRE Brokers: A Practical Playbook

October 26, 2026
Wire Fraud Prevention for CRE Brokers: A Practical Playbook

The most reliable way to prevent wire fraud in a real estate deal is to never trust wiring instructions that arrive by email, and to confirm every instruction and every change by phone, using a number you obtained independently. Add a two-person approval rule for sending funds and a written plan for the first hour after a bad wire, and you have covered most of the risk. This guide walks through how the scams work, what the warning signs look like, the controls that work for a small brokerage, and what to do if money has already left.

It is written for commercial real estate and commercial mortgage brokers, because your files are a favorite target: large dollar amounts, many parties, and a lot of email.

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TL;DR

  • The most common real estate wire fraud is business email compromise (BEC): a criminal inserts themselves into an email thread and sends new wiring instructions.
  • Verify every wire instruction by calling a number you found yourself, not one in the email, and treat any last-minute change as suspect.
  • Require two people to send a wire: one initiates, a second authorizes. Set daily limits.
  • If a wire goes wrong, call your bank for a recall immediately and file an FBI IC3 complaint within 24 hours.
  • Move documents and deal conversations out of open email into a controlled workspace, so there are fewer inboxes to compromise.

Table of Contents

Why commercial real estate deals attract wire fraud

FinCEN says the real estate sector is a primary target for BEC attacks because property transactions involve high dollar values and depend on email among many parties, such as title agents, escrow companies and buyers. Add a lender, a borrower, an attorney, an appraiser and a broker, and a single deal can have a dozen email addresses and several moments where money changes hands.

That structure is what criminals exploit. They do not need to hack a bank. They need one compromised or spoofed mailbox in the chain and a moment when someone is about to send funds. Deposits, appraisal and third-party report fees, good faith deposits, closing funds and payoff amounts all create that moment.

The pattern is also concentrated in the banking system you already use. FinCEN reported that nearly 88% of real estate BEC incidents it analyzed involved initial transfers of fraudulent funds to accounts at U.S. depository institutions. That matters for recovery, because it means your bank and the receiving bank can often act quickly if they hear from you in time.

The most common type: business email compromise

According to the National Association of Realtors, citing the FBI, BEC and email account compromise (EAC) were the most reported fraud in real estate in 2020. The mechanics are simple:

  1. A criminal gains access to an email account, or creates a lookalike address, and watches a live transaction.
  2. At a key moment, such as a deposit due date or closing, they send an email that appears to come from the title company, a lender, a seller's attorney or you.
  3. The email says wiring instructions have changed, or supplies instructions "for the first time."
  4. Someone sends the money to the criminal's account.

The scammer's main tool is trust and pressure. CertifID's 2024 fraud report notes that social engineering exploits human trust and that scammers often use urgency to push victims into acting before thinking.

What it looks like in a CRE file

Here is a realistic scenario, a composite and not a reported case. You are closing a bridge loan on a mixed-use property. Two days before closing, an email arrives that looks like it is from the closing attorney: "Our bank has changed. Please use the attached instructions for the borrower's wire. Please confirm once sent, as we are closing tomorrow." The signature is right, the tone is right, and the sender address differs by one letter. The borrower, who trusts you, forwards the instructions to their accountant and the money goes out.

Nothing about that required technical skill. It required an email, a deadline and a skipped phone call.

Warning signs to train yourself and your team to catch

The OCC's HelpWithMyBank.gov lists the signs of a wire transfer scam: urgent requests, altered or mismatched email addresses, complicated payment instructions, overpayment requests, demands for account information or login credentials, and insistence that wiring is the only way to pay. For real estate, the industry adds two more that come up constantly: changed wire instructions late in the deal, and email addresses that differ from a known address by a few letters.

Turn that into a short checklist your whole team can use:

  • Any change to wiring instructions. Treat it as fraud until proven otherwise.
  • New instructions sent as an attachment or by email at all. Legitimate parties prefer secure channels and phone confirmation.
  • Sender address that is almost right. Expand the display name and read the full address, character by character.
  • Pressure. "We close today," "the seller will walk," "the rate lock expires."
  • Requests to skip the usual process. "Don't call, I'm in a meeting," or "just reply here."
  • Unusual destination. An account in a different state, a different name, or a personal account for a business payee.
  • Requests for credentials or to "verify your account." The FBI advises not clicking unsolicited messages that ask you to update or verify account information.

No single sign is proof. Two together, or any one at the moment money is about to move, should stop the transaction until you have called.

How to verify wiring instructions before funds move

Verification is the control that does the most work. The NAR guidance is blunt: never email wire instructions or financial information, and verify instructions by calling a known, trusted number obtained independently, not contact details provided in the email.

In practice:

  1. Get the number before the deal gets busy. At kickoff, collect phone numbers for the title or escrow officer, closing attorney and lender contact from their official websites or your own prior files. Store them in your deal record.
  2. Call every time instructions are sent or changed. Read the routing number and account number back, and confirm the beneficiary name.
  3. Be wary of the call itself. The Washington State Auditor's Office cautions that bad actors can impersonate people in fake video or phone calls. Place the call yourself, to a number you already trust, and do not accept an inbound call as verification.
  4. Consider account validation. The same guidance notes that validation services can check whether an account is open and able to receive payment, the bank routing number, and account ownership.
  5. Send a small test only if your bank and the receiving party agree. It adds time, so plan for it, but it should never replace the phone call.
  6. Document it. Note who you called, at what number, when, and what they confirmed.

If you are coaching borrowers, say this out loud at the start: "You will receive wiring instructions only from the closing agent. If anything changes, or anything arrives from me that looks different, call us before sending." Borrowers are the most likely people to be tricked, and they will remember a warning given early.

For a state-level view of how closings are run, the real estate closing process in Florida shows where funds, title work and escrow come together, which is exactly where verification calls belong.

Internal controls for a small brokerage

You do not need a treasury department. You need written rules that make the safe path the default.

Two people, every wire

The Washington State Auditor's guidance recommends requiring two people to execute a wire: one initiates it and a second, preferably a supervisor or manager, authorizes the bank to release funds. Even in a two-person shop, the second approver can be a partner, an assistant with authority, or your bookkeeper. The point is that no single compromised inbox or rushed afternoon can send money alone.

Two people approve a wire before release

Documented procedures and limits

The same source recommends documented procedures, phone verification of instructions and changes using known contact information, and daily limits. Write a one-page procedure that answers:

  • Who may initiate and who may approve?
  • Which numbers are used for callbacks, and where are they stored?
  • What is the daily limit, and who can raise it?
  • Who do you call at your bank if something looks wrong?

Lock down accounts and devices

The FBI advises enabling multifactor authentication on any account that allows it. Start with email, your bank portal and any system where deal documents live. Add unique passwords through a password manager, keep devices updated, and remove old forwarding rules from mailboxes, which criminals use to quietly watch your threads.

Reduce what travels by email

Every borrower financial statement, rent roll, entity document and closing instruction you send by plain email is information a criminal can use to make a fake message convincing. Moving to controlled channels shrinks that exposure. Our guides on secure document sharing for CRE brokers and on shifting from email to portals cover how to do it without slowing lenders down.

Check the counterparty, not just the account

Advance-fee and deposit scams look different from BEC but end the same way: money wired to someone who should not have it. Before any borrower pays a lender deposit or third-party fee, run through private lender red flags. Your own closing process should also be written down. A commercial loan closing checklist with a built-in verification step means nobody has to remember it under pressure.

What a wire reveals, and whether your bank info can be stolen

Readers often ask whether someone can steal bank information from a wire transfer. A wire needs real details to work. JPMorgan explains that a typical wire requires the recipient's name, account number and bank information such as a routing number or IBAN, and it may pass through Fedwire, SWIFT and intermediary banks. An older but still useful overview from MIT-hosted research notes that wire messages generally carry the amount, date, originator, beneficiary and bank routing numbers, and that the sender's account number has generally been dropped from subsequent U.S. payment orders to keep it confidential.

The practical lesson: the bigger risk is not someone intercepting the wire in transit. It is you voluntarily handing account details, or funds, to an impostor. Never give your own account number or login credentials to anyone who contacts you first, and never send instructions by open email.

Do wires over $10,000 get reported to the IRS?

Not automatically, and this confuses many people. The federal rule behind the $10,000 figure concerns currency. The relevant regulation requires a financial institution to file a Currency Transaction Report for a transaction in currency exceeding $10,000, subject to exceptions. A bank wire is not physical cash.

The IRS makes the same point for Form 8300. Its reference guide gives an example of a $15,000 bank wire to a car dealer and says the wire is not cash, so the dealer has no Form 8300 obligation when the remaining currency is below $10,000. Generally, a trade or business that receives more than $10,000 in cash in one transaction or related transactions must file Form 8300.

Banks do have their own monitoring and suspicious activity obligations, so a large wire can still draw questions. For tax or compliance questions about a specific deal, ask your CPA or compliance counsel.

If you suspect a fraudulent wire, act in the first hour

Speed decides whether money can be pulled back. ALTA's Rapid Response Plan says time is of the essence and recommends organizing a team in advance so people act simultaneously. Its steps for a suspected incident: alert internal management, contact the sending and receiving banks to request a wire recall and account freeze, and file a complaint with the FBI's Internet Crime Complaint Center (IC3).

A workable sequence:

  1. Call your bank's fraud or wire department. Ask for a wire recall and give the amount, date, beneficiary and receiving bank.
  2. Tell the closing agent, lender and your management. Others may be targeted by the same impostor.
  3. File with IC3. NAR's guidance says to file within 24 hours, and no more than 72 hours, and to contact your local FBI office.
  4. Preserve evidence. Keep the emails with full headers, the instructions, wire confirmations and call notes. Do not delete anything.
  5. Secure your accounts. Change passwords, review mailbox rules and enable MFA.
  6. Notify your insurer and counsel as your policies and state requirements dictate.

FinCEN's Rapid Response Program, working with the FBI and U.S. Secret Service, has aided in freezing over $1.3 billion for U.S. victims of fraud since 2014, as reported in 2023. Recovery is never guaranteed, but fast reporting is what gives it a chance.

The FTC adds that if you sent a bank wire, you should contact the bank, report the fraud, and ask whether it can reverse the transfer. The same page advises never wiring money to anyone who pressures you to pay immediately or insists a wire is the only way to pay.

Our perspective

We built BrokersConnect around the view that most broker risk lives in the gaps between tools. A deal starts in a lender search, moves into a spreadsheet, spills into email, and ends with documents scattered across inboxes. Every handoff is a place where a spoofed message can look believable.

Our perspective — overview diagram

Our experience with brokers is that the habit matters more than the software. The brokers who avoid trouble treat wiring instructions as something that never arrives by email and always gets confirmed by voice. They keep documents in one controlled place, they keep lender conversations tied to the deal record so an out-of-pattern message stands out, and they keep a written closing checklist so verification is a step, not a memory.

We do not move your money, and BrokersConnect does not replace your bank's controls or a closing agent's own verification. What we can do is give you a single, organized workspace for the deal, so that a surprise email stands out against a clean record. Pair that with the phone-call rule and a second approver, and you have removed most of what criminals rely on.

— Theron

Keeping deals organized so surprises stand out

Fraud thrives in disorder: missing contacts, unclear versions, a closing timeline nobody tracks. BrokersConnect is a subscription platform for commercial real estate brokers, at $50 per month with a free trial and no commissions or transaction fees. It includes a deal pipeline CRM, a secure document vault, direct messaging, deal templates and AI-powered lender matching across a database of 289+ verified lenders. Keeping contacts, documents and lender conversations in one place gives your team a reliable record to check against when a message seems off. You can start with BrokersConnect and see whether it fits your workflow.

If closing pace is part of your pressure problem, our closing timeline management checklist shows how to plan the final 45 to 60 days so no one is rushed into a skipped call.

A one-page wire safety routine to adopt this week

Print this and keep it with your closing checklist:

  • Collect verified phone numbers for every closing party at kickoff.
  • Tell borrowers in writing, at the start, how wiring instructions will and will not reach them.
  • Never send wire instructions or account details by open email.
  • Call to verify every instruction and every change, using your own stored number.
  • Require two people to release any wire, with daily limits.
  • Turn on MFA for email, banking and document systems.
  • Know your bank's wire fraud contact and the IC3 filing steps before you need them.
  • Run a short drill once a year: if a wire went out wrong today, who calls whom?

Write the incident plan before you need it. ALTA's advice to organize a team in advance is the difference between a first hour spent making calls and a first hour spent figuring out whom to call.

FAQ

What is the most common type of wire fraud in real estate?

Business email compromise, including email account compromise, was the most reported type of real estate wire fraud in 2020, according to NAR citing the FBI. A criminal impersonates a trusted party and sends new or changed wiring instructions, often with a tight deadline.

How do I verify wiring instructions safely?

Call the party using a phone number you obtained independently, such as one from their official website or your own earlier records, and never one from the email that contains the instructions. Confirm the account details and beneficiary name aloud. Because impostors can fake calls, place the call yourself rather than relying on an inbound one.

What should I do if I already sent money to a scammer?

Contact your bank immediately to request a wire recall, then file an IC3 complaint within 24 hours and no later than 72 hours, per NAR's guidance. Alert your management, the closing agent and the receiving bank, and keep every email and confirmation as evidence.

Are wire transfers over $10,000 reported to the IRS?

Not as a rule. The $10,000 thresholds in Currency Transaction Reports and Form 8300 apply to cash, and the IRS states that a bank wire is not cash for Form 8300 purposes. Banks still monitor for suspicious activity, so ask your CPA about any specific situation.

Sources